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DEFENCES OF AN ACTION IN TORT
(GENERAL EXCEPTIONS)
QUESTION BANK
Q.1. Discuss the maxim “volenti nonfit injuria.”
Q.2. Every injury imparts damage, but every damage is not injury. Discuss.
Q.3. Explain the defence- 'Volenti nonfit injuria’ fully
Q.4. Discuss the defence- 'necessity' and 'inevitable accident' with the help of
case law.
SHORT NOTES
SYNOPSIS
2. Sovereign Immunity & Executive Acts
3. Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Acts
a. Unlawful Acts:
b. Breach of Statutory Duty:
c. Rescue Cases:
d. Negligence:
i. Statutory Authority
Types of Statutory Authority:
Absolute Authority:
Conditional Authority:
General Exceptions in the Law of Torts
Under certain conditions, an act that would otherwise amount to a tort ceases to be wrongful. In such circumstances, the act is considered justified or excused, shielding the actor from civil liability. Sir Frederick Pollock refers to these conditions as the "rules of immunity which limit the rules of liability in general," commonly known as General Exceptions.
These exceptions are broadly categorised into two types:
Specific Exceptions: Defences that apply only to specific torts (e.g., truth, fair comment, and privilege are exclusive defences to the tort of “Defamation”).
General Exceptions: Defences that apply universally across various categories of tortious liability (e.g., consent, necessity, private defence).
Note on Analogy: The concept of General Exceptions in Tort Law closely mirrors the "General Exceptions" provided under Chapter IV of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860 (now under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023), though the standard of proof and remedies differ.
An Act of State is an exercise of sovereign power by the executive head of a State or its authorized agents against an alien or alien property outside the municipal jurisdiction. It is an act injurious to the person or property of someone who was not, at the time of the act, a citizen/subject of the State, and which is either previously authorized or subsequently ratified by the sovereign power.
Buron v. Denman
A British naval commander released slaves and burnt a slave barracoon belonging to a Spanish subject on the West Coast of Africa. His action was subsequently ratified by the British Government. The court held that this was an Act of State, and the Spaniard had no remedy in English municipal courts.
2. Sovereign Immunity & Executive Acts
Under this exception, public officers or the State itself are exempted from tortious liability when performing duties within the bounds of law and in good faith.
Statutory Protection in India: The Judicial Officers Protection Act, 1850, protects judicial officers acting bona fide within their jurisdiction. Police officers and administrative officers are similarly protected under various state Police Acts and Public Servants Protection Acts.
Limitation: This defence fails if there is misfeasance (performing a lawful act in an unlawful, malicious manner) or if the act is completely outside the scope of statutory authority.
Etti v. Secretary of State for India
A newborn child was negligently delivered to the wrong person by staff at a government hospital. The Court held that running a hospital for charity/welfare was a function protected under the traditional umbrella of sovereign functions at that time, absolving the State of vicarious liability. (Note: The modern position in India has shifted significantly away from sovereign immunity via cases like Common Cause v. Union of India).
Dharua Marali v. K.B. Patil
A Revenue Inspector opened a reservoir outlet in good faith to supply water to cultivators' lands, accidentally damaging the plaintiff's crops. The court held that the act was done in the discharge of official duties without any oblique motive, protecting the officer from liability.
Judicial officers, tribunals, and quasi-judicial bodies (like university disciplinary committees, club committees, or professional councils) are immune from civil actions for acts done in the exercise of their judicial functions.
Audi alteram partem (Hear the other side; issuing fair notice and giving a reasonable opportunity to defend).
Nemo judex in causa sua (No one should be a judge in their own cause).
Dawkins v. Antrobus
The plaintiff was expelled from a club for misconduct. The committee followed the rules of the club, gave due notice, and acted in good faith. The court held that it would not interfere with the decision of a quasi-judicial body if the principles of natural justice were satisfied.
The maxim Volenti non fit injuria means "to a willing person, injury is not done." Harm suffered voluntarily does not constitute a legal injury and is not actionable. If a person consents to the risk of an act, they cannot complain of the consequences later.
A spectator at a cricket match hit by a ball, a boxer in a ring, or a patient consenting to a surgical operation cannot sue for ordinary risks inherent to those activities.
Cutler v. United Dairies (London) Ltd.
A driver shouted for help to hold an unmanageable horse. The plaintiff voluntarily entered the field to help, was thrown, and got injured. The court held the maxim applied because the plaintiff knowingly and willingly accepted the risk when there was no immediate danger to human life.
a. Unlawful Acts: Consent cannot legitimise an act prohibited by law (e.g., a street duel with deadly weapons or bare-fist street fighting).
b. Breach of Statutory Duty: The maxim cannot be pleaded where the defendant has violated a mandatory statutory safety duty. (e.g., Wheeler v. New Merton Board Mills Ltd [1933])
c. Rescue Cases:
The maxim does not apply when the plaintiff deliberately encounters a risk to rescue someone from an imminent danger created by the defendant's negligence.
Haynes v. Harwood
The defendant’s servant negligently left a horse-drawn cart unattended in a crowded street. A boy threw a stone, causing the horses to bolt. A police constable rushed out to save women and children and suffered severe injuries. The court held that Volenti non fit injuria did not apply because the rescuer was compelled by a moral and legal duty to act.
d. Negligence:
Consent to a risk does not imply consent to the negligence of the defendant. A passenger boarding a car consents to ordinary transit risks, but not to the driver operating the vehicle while heavily intoxicated (Dann v. Hamilton [1939]).
Comparison between the two is as follows.
Feature | Inevitable Accident | Act of God (Vis Major) |
Definition | An accident that could not have been prevented by the exercise of ordinary care, caution, and human skill. | An accident caused exclusively by the elemental forces of nature, without human intervention. |
Human Agency | Involves human operations or machinery but remains unavoidable. | Completely free from human intervention. |
Examples | A tire blowout on a well-maintained car; a pedestrian stepping in front of a vehicle suddenly. | Unprecedented rainfall, extraordinary floods, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions. |
Holmes v. Mather
The defendant’s horses were startled by the barking of dogs on a public highway. Despite the driver's best efforts to guide them, the horses ran over the plaintiff. The court held the defendant not liable as it was an inevitable accident.
Brown v. Kendall
While attempting to separate two fighting dogs with a stick, the defendant accidentally struck the plaintiff in the eye. The American court held that the act of separating the dogs was lawful and done with proper care; the injury was a pure inevitable accident.
Nichols v. Marsland
The defendant formed artificial lakes on her land. An extraordinary rainfall—the heaviest in human memory—caused the lakes to burst, washing away four bridges belonging to the plaintiff. The court held the defendant not liable because the escape was caused exclusively by an Act of God.
The defence of necessity is encapsulated in the maxims Salus populi suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law) and Necessitas non habet legem (necessity knows no law).
Under this defence, an intentional act causing harm is justified if it is committed to prevent a far greater evil.
Pulling down a burning house to stop a fire from consuming a whole neighbourhood; throwing cargo overboard to prevent a ship from sinking (Mouse’s Case, 1608).
Necessity cannot be used to justify the deliberate taking of an innocent human life, nor can it be claimed that the necessity was created by the defendant's own prior negligence.
Gregson v. Gilbert (The Zong Ship Case):
The captain of a slave ship threw 150 enslaved people into the sea, claiming a shortage of water. In this historic insurance dispute, the court held that no necessity could justify the killing of human beings to claim insurance money. (The conceptual counterpart in criminal law is R v. Dudley and Stephens [1884]).
No civil action lies for harm inflicted in the reasonable defence of one's person or property. In India, this principle mirrors the right established under Sections 96 to 106 of the Indian Penal Code.
Morris v. Nugent
As the plaintiff’s dog passed the defendant, it bit him. As the dog was running away, the defendant shot it. The court held that the defendant was liable because the danger was over once the dog turned to run away; shooting it was an act of retaliation, not private defence.
The law does not concern itself with trifles. This rule is formalized under Section 95 of the IPC. If an act causes harm so microscopic or trivial that a person of ordinary sense and temper would not complain, no tortious liability arises.
A person touching a commuter's shoulder gently to ask for directions or tapping a fireman's arm to alert them to a structural collapse does not commit a battery. However, this defence cannot be used if an explicit legal right is flagrantly violated (such as a deliberate, unauthorized entry onto private land, which constitutes Trespass).
i. Statutory Authority
When the legislature authorizes an act by passing a statute, the doing of that act is completely immunized from tortious liability. The State or its authorized corporation is not liable for any incidental or necessary consequences of that act, provided there is no negligence.
Absolute Authority: The statute permits the act unconditionally. Even if incidental nuisance or harm occurs (e.g., smoke, noise, and vibration from a legally established railway track), no action lies.
Conditional Authority: The statute permits the act on the condition that it must be done without causing a nuisance or injury to others.
Vaughan v. Taff Vale Railway Co
Sparks from a railway engine running under statutory authority set fire to the plaintiff’s adjoining woods. The court held that since the railway company had taken all possible precautions and acted strictly under statutory powers, they were not liable for the incidental damage.
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